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We characterize the intersection of the probabilistically sophisticated and multiple prior models. We
show this class is strictly larger than the subjective expected utility model and that its elements
can be generated from a generalized class of the "-contaminated priors, which we dub the "-
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To what extent can the maximin expected utility (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) and the probabilistically sophisticated model of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) co-
exist? The latter is a generalization of the models of de Finetti and Savage in which choice
may be viewed as being based on beliefs that can be represented by a convex-ranged prob-
ability measure. This provides a foundation for the non-expected utility models under risk
dealing with Allais-type paradoxes in the Savage framework of purely subjective uncertainty.
The explicit motivation o⁄ered by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for their maximin expected
utility (also known as the ￿ multiple prior￿ ) model is to accommodate choice patterns such
as those in the classic Ellsberg Paradoxes, where it can be shown that choice cannot be ra-
tionalized by beliefs that can be represented by ￿ additive￿probabilities; that is, the Ellsberg
paradox is not consistent with probabilistic sophistication. Thus, the question raised at the
beginning is natural and important.
It was Marinacci (2002) who raised this important question, and established, under some
conditions, that the only intersection of these two models is Savage￿ s subjective expected
utility (SEU) model. He maintains that the conditions are mild and thus he draws the con-
clusion that ￿once we wish to deal with Ellsberg-type phenomena with an MEU preference
relation, we can no longer accommodate Allais-type phenomena via probabilistic sophis-
tication, even ￿locally￿ on the collection of unambiguous events.￿(Marinacci, 2002, p755,
emphasis added).
In this paper, we fully characterize the class of MEU preferences which are probabilisti-
cally sophisticated on a given su¢ ciently rich collection of unambiguous events, but, unlike
Marinacci, without any extra conditions. The class of such preferences obviously must in-
clude SEU preferences, but we show that it is strictly larger. We then derive Marinacci￿ s
result restricted to the MEU model as a corollary, by showing that among these preferences
we identify, only SEU preferences satis￿es Marinacci￿ s condition. In this sense, the ￿rst con-
tribution of this paper is a generalization of Marinacci￿ s result applied to the MEU model,
1which provides a deeper understanding of the relation between MEU and probabilistic so-
phistication.
Obviously, our result above would be of little economic and decision theoretic interest
if those probabilistically sophisticated MEU preferences other than SEU turned out to be
pathological. We therefore investigate those probabilistically sophisticated MEU preferences,
which do not satisfy Marinacci￿ s condition.
The second contribution of this paper is that we characterize this class and show that they
can be generated from a generalized class of the so called "-contamination model; in fact, the
basis for the class of probability sophisticated MEU preferences is essentially expressed by a
two parameter family of sets of probability measures which is just one parameter richer than
the "-contamination model, which we dub the "-contaminated (upper) ￿-truncated prior.
The "-contamination model has been applied in economic applications.1 Also, as we shall
demonstrate, the "-contaminated ￿-truncated prior model is rich enough to accommodate
Allais￿type behavior.
We contend that the "-contaminated ￿-truncated prior model proposed in this paper is
simple and easy to handle, and so it is also useful in applications. Although the Marinacci
condition may appear mild in the particular setup he chose, it does rule out this important
class of preferences, and hence it may not be so innocuous for the original question of
identifying probabilistically sophisticated MEU.
2 Framework
The set-up consists of a set S of states of the world, a collection ￿ of subsets of S and a set
of consequences X.
For any E ￿ S, let Ec denote its complement. We shall refer to any subset E in ￿ as
an (unambiguous) event. Marinacci (2002) focuses on Dynkin systems as the appropriate
structure for the collection of unambiguous events and so we shall take ￿ to be a Dynkin
1 See for instance Carlier et al (2003), Lo (2000), Nishimura and Ozaki (2004).
2system: that is, (i) S 2 ￿, (ii) it is closed under complementation, that is, if E 2 ￿ then
so Ec 2 ￿ (hence ? 2 ￿) and (iii) for any countable sequence of pairwise disjoint events,
En 2 ￿, n = 1;2;:::,Ei \ Ej = ?, for all i 6= j, their countable union [1
n=1En is also in ￿.
A function Q : ￿ ! [0;1] is a convex-ranged probability measure if (i) Q(S) = 1, (ii) for





and (iii) for all Q(E) > 0 and ￿ in (0;1), there exists an event E0 ￿ E such that Q(E0) =
￿Q(E). Let P be the set of all such measures.
Denote by ￿￿ the smallest ￿-￿eld (that is, it also closed under intersections) containing
￿. By Dynkin￿ s theorem, there is a unique extension of a convex-ranged probability measure
Q on ￿￿. Abusing notation we shall simply call each element Q of P a probability measure,
and treat it as if a measure on ￿￿ in the sequel.
An act f : S ! X is a ￿￿ measurable function such that f (S) is a ￿nite set. The set
of such acts is denoted by F. The individual￿ s preferences over acts is denoted by a binary
relation % ￿ F ￿ F. With slight abuse of notation each x 2 X will also denote the constant
act that yields x no matter which s in S obtains. Thus, x % f means the act f is not
preferred to receiving the outcome x for sure.
For a given preference relation %, an event is deemed null if there is indi⁄erence between
any two acts that only di⁄er on that event. That is, E is null if for any pair of acts f;g 2 F,
f (s) = g (s), for all s = 2 E implies f ￿ g. An event E is deemed universal if its complement
Ec is null.
Let U denote the set of utility indices, that is, the set of mappings of the form u : X ! R.
For given u 2 U and f 2 F, let u￿f denote the random variable, where u￿f (s) = u(f (s))
for all s in S. Since the range of f 2 F is ￿nite, u ￿ f is ￿￿ measurable and the integral
R
S u ￿ f dP is well de￿ned and ￿nite for any P 2 P and any utility index u 2 U.
We consider the weak* topology on P with the set of these ￿￿ measurable random
variables of utilities as its dual: a sequence of probabilities fQn : n = 1;:::g converges to
Q 2 P i⁄
R
S u ￿ f dQn !
R
S u ￿ f dQ for any f 2 F and any u 2 U, which is equivalent to
3Qn (E) ! Q(E) for all E 2 ￿.2 In particular, note that if every Qn is absolutely continuous
with respect to a probability P, so is the limit Q.
3 Probabilistic Sophistication
The intuitive idea behind an individual being probabilistic sophisticated with respect to a
given probability measure P de￿ned over a collection of unambiguous events is that the
e⁄ect of assigning an outcome x to an event E that is deemed unambiguous depends solely
on the resulting contribution of probability P (E) the event makes to the overall probability
P (f￿1 (x)) of obtaining x, rather than on any speci￿c ￿state-dependence￿between x and
E. That is, such events serve only as a randomization device, and they do not contain any
further information about preferences. Thus in evaluating an unambiguous act, that is, an
act that is measurable with respect to the collection of unambiguous events, a probabilis-
tically sophisticated individual appears as if he ￿rst works out the probability distribution
over outcomes (that is, a lottery) induced by the act, and then he evaluates the lottery
without further regard to how this lottery is generated. Another way of saying this is that
probabilistic sophistication requires any pair of unambiguous acts that are both mapped by
P to the same lottery over outcomes should come from the same indi⁄erence class.
De￿nition 1 An individual is said to be probabilistically sophisticated on F if there exists











for all x 2 X ) f ￿ g.
It is known that if an individual is probabilistically sophisticated, Ellsberg-type paradoxes
do not arise. But since probabilistic sophistication imposes no restriction on the preferences
over the induced lotteries, Allais-type paradoxes are consistent with probabilistic sophisti-
cation.3
2 In other words, this is the relative topology on the set of convex ranged measures induced from the
weak* topology of the set of all ￿nitely additive measures.
3 See Machina and Schmeidler (1992) and Grant (1995) for discussion.
4The subjective expected utility (SEU) model is the special case of a probabilistically
sophisticated individual whose preferences over acts can be completely determined by a
probability measure P and a utility index u:4 An SEU maximizer chooses among acts as if
she ￿rst uses her utility index to map consequences to ￿ utilities￿and then uses her subjective
probability measure to determine the (cumulative) probability distribution over utilities (a
unidimensional ￿ outcome￿set). She then compares alternative acts solely on the basis of the
means of the induced distributions over utilities.
In order to de￿ne this class formally, it is convenient to associate with each act the cu-
mulative distribution over utilities induced by the utility index and the probability measure.
That is, ￿x a utility index u and a probability measure P 2 P, and for each act f 2 F
denote by F P
u￿f (￿) the cumulative distribution function over utilities induced by u and P,
where for each z in R,
F
P
u￿f (z) := P (fs 2 S : u(f (s)) ￿ zg).





S u ￿ f dP.
De￿nition 2 An individual is said to be a (Savage) subjective expected utility (SEU) maxi-
mizer if there exists a unique (up to positive a¢ ne transformations) utility index u 2 U, and









4 Maximin Expected Utility
As we noted in the introduction, the MEU model of Gilboa and Schmeidler has been used
to generate preferences that can accommodate Ellsberg paradox patterns of behavior. We
4 Strictly speaking, in the SEU setup ￿ is also a ￿￿algebra. But we shall refer to the model here as SEU
as well.
5follow Marinacci and adopt the next de￿nition as the analog of Gilboa and Schmeidler￿ s
MEU model in the Savage state-act framework of purely subjective uncertainty.5
De￿nition 3 An individual is said to be a minimum expected utility (MEU) maximizer if
there exists a unique (up to positive a¢ ne transformations) utility index u 2 U, and a unique
non-empty weak￿-compact and convex set C ￿ P, such that for all pair of acts f;g 2 F,












While probabilistic sophistication requires the existence of a unique probability measure
to evaluate acts, the maximin expected utility model postulates a set of probability mea-
sures and the individual maximizes the minimum expected utility where the minimum is
taken over the set of probabilities. Thus it may appear, and in fact we believe that it is a
common ￿intuition￿shared in the literature, that only a ￿ polar￿case of an MEU maximizer
exhibits probabilistic sophistication, namely an SEU maximizer, and that any non-trivial
MEU preference relation, as it requires a multiplicity of underlying probability measures,
cannot be probabilistically sophisticated. Indeed, Marinacci showed the following result:6
Corollary to Marinacci￿ s Proposition 1 Suppose an individual is an MEU maximizer




P (E) = max
P2C
P (E) < 1,
5 Cassadesus-Masanell et al (2000) provide an axiomatization of the MEU model in a setting of purely
subjective uncertainty in which ￿ is an algebra and X is connected and separable. The richness of the
outcome space allows them to work with either an in￿nite or ￿nite state space. We are unaware of any
axiomatization of the MEU model in a setting analogous to that of Savage and that would as a consequence
require the set of probability measures in the MEU representation all to be convex-ranged.
6 Marrinacci actually establishes this result for any member of the ￿￿MEU family, for which ￿ 6= 1=2.
An ￿￿MEU preference admits a representation of the form









Clearly, the MEU family corresponds to ￿ = 1 .
6then the following two statements are equivalent:
1. The individual is probabilistically sophisticated.
2. The individual is a SEU maximizer.
In other words, this result con￿rms that probabilistic sophistication and MEU implies
SEU, thus all the Allais-type paradoxes are not consistent with MEU, under the ￿ regularity￿
assumption that there is at least one event that is neither null nor universal and on which
all the probabilities measures in C assign the same probability.
Obviously, the strength of the regularity assumption needs to be examined to appreciate
the result above. Marinacci contends that it only entails there exists at least one proper
￿ unambiguous￿event, and so it is mild and innocuous. This argument is especially con-
vincing if it has been established that the decision maker￿ s perception about ambiguity is
represented by the particular set of probabilities. In other words, the argument is valid if one
has already established that considerations about beliefs can be completely separated from
considerations over utilities. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) propose a notion of absolute
ambiguity aversion and an associated notion of ambiguity neutrality that builds upon a
particular notion of comparative ambiguity aversion that entails such a separation. Epstein
(1999), however, proposes a di⁄erent notion of comparative ambiguity aversion that leads to
a di⁄erent notion of ambiguity neutrality that need not result in a complete separation.7
What the appropriate notion of comparative ambiguity aversion is, remains a contentious
issue in the literature. But it is one that we do not need to directly confront in this paper.
Rather we simply note that we shall show in the sequel that the class of probabilistically
sophisticated MEU preferences is much larger than the class of SEU preferences, and it
contains an important class of MEU preferences. We discuss the key idea in the next section.
7 See also the discussion in Epstein & Zhang (2001).
75 Subjective Rank Dependent Expected Utility
A popular generalization of expected utility under risk is the rank dependent expected utility
model (RDEU) of Quiggin (1982) and Yaari (1981). A Subjective Rank Dependent Expected
Utility (SRDEU) maximizer like his SEU counterpart, acts as if he associates with each act
the cumulative probability distribution over utilities induced by his utility index and his
subjective probability measure. But before taking any expectations, he ￿rst transforms
the cumulative probability distribution using his probability transformation function. By
de￿nition a probability transformation is a function ￿ : [0;1] ! [0;1], which is a non-
decreasing function with ￿(0) = 0 and ￿(1) = 1. He then compares acts solely on the basis
of the mean of each transformed induced distribution over utilities, which is ￿￿F P
u￿f (z). Note
that since each act f is assumed to be ￿nite range, ￿ ￿ F P
u￿f (z) is a well de￿ned cumulative
distribution function.
Denote by T the set of probability transformation functions, and by TCON the set of
probability transformation functions that are concave.
De￿nition 4 An individual is said to be a subjective rank-dependent expected utility (SRDEU)
maximizer if there exists a unique (up to positive a¢ ne transformations) utility index u :
X ! R, a unique probability measure P 2 P, and a unique probability transformation
function ￿ 2 T , such that for all pair of acts f;g 2 F, f % g if and only if
Z




zd ￿ ￿ F
P
u￿g (z) . (3)
Clearly, for any two acts f and g, if P (f￿1 (x)) = P (g￿1 (x)) for all x 2 X, then the
distribution functions ￿ ￿ F P
u￿f (z) and ￿ ￿ F P
u￿g (z) are identical. So, a SRDEU maximizer is
probabilistically sophisticated on F.
An SRDEU model is known to be a special case of the Choquet Expected Utility model
in which preferences are represented via the Choquet integral of utility with respect to a
non-additive measure or capacity over a ￿-￿eld.8 For the SRDEU model the associated
8 See Wakker (1990).
8capacity is given by ￿￿ (E) := 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ P (E)), and this is convex if and only if ￿ is
concave.9 That is, one can write
R
zd ￿ ￿ F P
u￿f (z) =
R
u￿fd￿￿, where the latter integral is
the Choquet integral. Recall our convention of treating P as a measure on ￿￿ and hence ￿￿
is also a capacity over ￿￿.
On the other hand, it is known10 that when the capacity is convex the Choquet integral
of a real-valued function admits an MEU representation: denote by Core(￿) the core of
capacity ￿, which is by de￿nition the set of all ￿nitely additive probability measures p with
p(E) ￿ ￿ (E) for all E 2 ￿. It can be shown that Core(￿) is convex and compact. Then a






Combining these results, we conclude:
Proposition 1 For any ￿ 2 TCON, the associated SRDEU maximizer with utility function
u and probability measure P is probabilistically sophisticated and also it is a MEU maximizer
with the set of probabilities C = Core(￿￿).
Notice that the result above suggests that there are probabilistically sophisticated MEU
maximizers who are not SEU maximizers. But it does not characterize the whole class
of probabilistically sophisticated MEU maximizers; that is, there may be other types of
probabilistically sophisticated MEU maximizers. Also, it does not say if a SRDEU maximizer
9 To see this, recall a capacity is convex, if for all A;B 2 ￿,
￿ (A [ B) + ￿ (A \ B) ￿ ￿ (A) + ￿ (B).
If we set p := P (A \ Bc), q := P (B \ Ac), and r := P (Ac \ Bc), then for the SRDEU example, this
condition, becomes, for all p;q;r ￿ 0, s.t. p + q + r ￿ 1,
￿(r) + ￿(r + p + q) ￿ ￿(r + q) + ￿(r + p),
or equivalently,
￿(r + p + q) ￿ ￿(r + p) ￿ ￿(r + q) ￿ ￿(r).
10 See for instance Theorem 2.2 of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1995) and its references.
9is of economic and decision theoretic interest. In the next section, we ￿rst examine the latter
issue.
6 A Canonical Example: The Epsilon-Contaminated
Gamma-Truncated-Prior
The purpose of this section is to present a simple two parameter class of SRDEU prefer-
ences, which is straightforward to handle but rich enough to accommodate various economic
questions.
Consider the following two-parameter family of probability transformation functions:
￿(";￿) (p) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if p = 0
" + (1 ￿ ")p=(1 ￿ ￿) if p 2 (0;1 ￿ ￿]
1 if p > 1 ￿ ￿
, where (";￿) 2 [0;1)
2 .
Since ￿(0;0) is the identity function, this corresponds to an SEU maximizer. Note that ￿(";￿)
is increasing and concave, thus it belongs to TCON. Thus by Proposition 1, an SRDEU
maximizer with utility function u, probability measure P and probability transformation
function ￿(";￿) admits an MEU representation for each (";￿) 2 [0;1)
2.
We shall show below that for any (";￿), with " > 0, the preferences exhibit the ￿ certainty￿
e⁄ect which is often given as an intuitive explanation for Allais paradox patterns of choices.
That is, this class of SRDEU preferences can generate choice patterns consistent with those
exhibited in standard Allais paradoxes.
To see this, it is convenient to de￿ne
inf F = supfz : F (z) = 0g
and ￿F (z) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if F (z) = 0
F (z)=(1 ￿ ￿) if F (z) 2 (0;1 ￿ ￿]
1 if F (z) > 1 ￿ ￿
10In words, inf F is the greatest lower bound of the support of a random variable with a cu-
mulative distribution function F, and ￿F (￿) is the cumulative distribution function obtained
by truncating the upper ￿￿ tail of that random variable.
Notice that for any cumulative distribution function F on R, the transformed cumulative
distribution function ￿(";￿) ￿ F is given by
￿(";￿) ￿ F (z) = "￿inf F (z) + (1 ￿ ")[￿F (z)];
where ￿^ z denotes the cumulative distribution function of a degenerate random variable which
assigns its unit probability to the real number ^ z. Applying this to the SRDEU formula (3),
we have that the preferences can be represented by the following functional11
V (f) = "inf F
P









In the table below we list how this functional evaluates four acts, f;g;f0;g0, that are
each measurable with respect to the partition fA;B;Cg of S and for which P (A) = 0:89,
P (B) = 0:1 and P (C) = 0:01. Without loss of generality we assume u(5) = 1, u(0) = 0
and u(1) = v 2 (0;1), and for the purposes of rationalizing Allais-paradox choice behavior
we take ￿ to be less than 0:1. In the last column of the table, the utility of each act is
computed from (3), or equivalently from (5).
act Event SRDEU V (:)
A B C
f 1 1 1 v
g 1 5 0 (1 ￿ ")[0:89v + (0:1 ￿ ￿)]=(1 ￿ ￿)
f0 0 1 1 (1 ￿ ")(0:11 ￿ ￿)v=(1 ￿ ￿)
g0 0 5 0 (1 ￿ ")(0:1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿)
11 The reason that neither " = 1 nor ￿ = 1 are valid parameter values is that the probability measure
P in the SRDEU representation is no longer unique, since any probability measure that is mutually and
absolutely continous with P could be used in place of P.
11For the SRDEU preference relation % that is rationalized by V (:) to generate the classic
Allais paradox, we require f % g and g ￿ f. That is,
V (f) ￿ V (g) = "v + (1 ￿ ")




0) ￿ V (f
0) = (1 ￿ ")
[(0:1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (0:11 ￿ ￿)v]
(1 ￿ ￿)
> 0.
It is straightforward to verify that there exists a non-empty set of permissible values for the
three parameters v, " and ￿ for which these two inequalities hold. Indeed, if f ￿ g, then
"v = (1 ￿ ")
[(0:1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (0:11 ￿ ￿)v]
(1 ￿ ￿)
,
in which case " > 0 implies g0 ￿ f0. So if there is close to indi⁄erence between the ￿rst
pair a small perturbation of the parameters from expected utility exhibits the classic Allais
paradox.
For the purpose of applications, it will be useful and also instructive to consider the set
of extreme points of minp2Core(￿)
R
fdp in (4), that is, the set of measures in Core(￿) which
actually achieve the minimum for some act f. Let PP ￿ P denote the set of probability
measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to P. That is, Q will be in PP, if
for every E 2 ￿, P (E) = 0 implies Q(E) = 0. And for each ￿ in [0;1), let ￿PP be the
set of probability measures that can be obtained by updating the prior P conditional on an
event for which P assigns at least 1 ￿ ￿. More formally, write P (￿jE) for the conditional
probability measure given event E with P (E) > 0: i.e., P (AjE) = P (A \ E)=P (E) for
every A 2 ￿. Then,
￿P
P = fQ 2 P
P : Q = P (￿jE) for some E 2 ￿ with P (E) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿g:















is the convex hull of ￿PP.
12Notice that for the particular case of ￿ = 0, the set of priors "
￿
PP￿
+ (1 ￿ ")fPg is
sometimes referred to in the literature as an epsilon-contaminated prior. When " = 0, the
parameter ￿ de￿nes a cut-o⁄ value of the upper tail distribution for the induced random
utility u￿f. So intuitively, we may view the general case with non-zero " and ￿, as de￿ning
sets of probability measures ￿ centered￿around a focal prior belief P. Imprecision about
this focal prior P manifests itself by the inclusion of the epsilon convex mixtures of certain
measures that are absolutely continuous with this prior.
We shall refer to this two parameter family of MEU preferences the The Epsilon-Contaminated
Gamma-Truncated-Prior model, as is de￿ned below.
De￿nition 5 An individual is said to be an "￿contaminated ￿￿truncated prior MEU max-
imizer if there exists a unique (up to positive a¢ ne transformations) utility index u 2 U, a
probability P 2 P, and (";￿) 2 [0;1)















We want to show that the preference relation de￿ned above with utility index u(￿) and
parameters (";￿) 2 [0;1)
2 coincides with an SRDEU preference relation with utility index
u(￿), underlying probability measure P and probability transformation function ￿(";￿) (￿).
Hence in particular it shows an "￿contaminated ￿￿truncated prior MEU maximizer has an
MEU representation as we have already argued. For this purpose, one can examine the core
of ￿￿(";￿), which is equivalent to establish the following result.
































The second equality follows from the fact that ￿PP is closed, and from the general property
of a support function in convex analysis: the support function of a set is identical to the














holds. Indeed, it is clear from the structure of ￿PP that any minimizer Q￿ of the right hand























zdf"￿inf F (z) + (1 ￿ ") ￿F (z)g
= "inf F
P



















































To sum up, we have established that an MEU maximizer with the set of priors CP
(";￿) is an
SRDEU maximizer, and that in particular such a preference relation exhibits probabilistic
sophistication by Proposition 1.
Notice that for any (";￿) 6= (0;0), Marinacci￿ s regularity condition does not hold for
the set CP
(";￿) and so his theorem has no bite in this class. Nevertheless, as we have shown,
an "-contaminated ￿-truncated-prior MEU maximizer is probabilistically sophisticated, and
can readily accommodate Allais paradox behavior. Since this class of preferences contains
an important class of MEU preferences such as the epsilon contamination model, we are
led to conclude that Marinacci￿ s regularity condition, which rules out this class, is not so
innocuous for the question he raised.
147 The Characterization
The purpose of this section is to give a complete characterization of the class of probabilis-
tically sophisticated MEU model. As Proposition 1 suggests, it is larger than the class of
the "-contaminated ￿-truncated-prior model. But we shall argue that in fact these canoni-
cal examples of ￿ contaminated priors￿provide a basis to identify the set of probabilistically
sophisticated MEU.
First, we show that if an MEU model is represented as an SRDEU as is the "-contaminated
￿ truncated-prior model, then it must be expressed as an ￿envelope￿of the "-contaminated
￿ truncated-prior functionals.
Lemma 3 Fix a prior belief P, a utility index u, and a concave probability transformation













u￿f (z) for all f 2 F.








Proof. Consider the epigraph of ￿ on (0;1]; i.e., f(p;q) 2 (0;1] ￿ R : ￿(p) ￿ qg. Since
￿ is concave, the epigraph is a closed convex set and thus it is the intersection of half spaces
restricted on (0;1] ￿ R containing it. Notice that a half space restricted on (0;1] ￿ R is
exactly the epigraph of ￿(";￿) for some (";￿). That is, if we de￿ne D = f(";￿) 2 (0;1]
2 :
￿(";￿) (p) ￿ ￿(p) for all p 2 (0;1]g, we have ￿ = inf(";￿)2D ￿(";￿). Then, by construction, the
corresponding set of measures C is exactly the intersection of CP





Essentially, we can build up any probabilistically sophisticated set of priors by taking
intersections of CP
(";￿) sets and then take the convex hull of the unions of these intersections.
In this sense the contaminated prior class discussed in the previous section provides a basis
for the entire class of probabilistically sophisticated sets of multiple priors.
15In general, the class of probabilistically sophisticated MEU maximizers is larger than the
class of SRDEU maximizers. The following provides a characterization.
Theorem 4 Fix a preference relation % that admits a non-trivial MEU representation






where C ￿ P is a closed and convex set, and the range of u(:) has non-empty interior. Then
the following two statements are equivalent.
1. The relation % is probabilistically sophisticated on F.
2. There exists a unique convex-ranged probability measure P : ￿ ! [0;1], and a set of
probability transformation functions ￿ ￿ TCON, such that for all f 2 F










Proof. (1) ) (2). Let P be the probability with respect to which % is probabilistically
sophisticated. We regard (S;P) a probability space. Denote by U the range of utility index
u, i.e., U = u(X). Hereafter we shall simply say a random variable for a random variable
from S to U. For each act f, note that u￿f is a random variable. Conversely, for any given
random variable ^ f, there is an act f with u ￿ f = ^ f.
By the assumption of MEU preferences, the utility of an act f is determined by the
corresponding random variable u￿f only. So we can unambiguously de￿ne a utility function




:= V (f) with ^ f = u ￿ f.12
We claim that V ￿ exhibits distribution invariance: that is, if two random variables ^ f








. To see this, for
12 Notice that this follows from MEU assumption and it is not a direct consequence of probabilistic
sophistication since u ￿ f = u ￿ f0 does not imply that the induced distributions of outcomes are identical.
Assumption of MEU implies that outcomes are already transformed into utility indices, which in e⁄ect
assumes the so called reduction principle. This does not come for free, since in general even a state dependent
expected utility model can be probabilistically sophisticated if the reduction assumption is dropped. See
Grant and Karni (2004).
16each number ^ u in the ￿nite common range of ^ f and ^ f0, ￿x an outcome x^ u 2 u￿1 (^ u), and set
f (s) = x^ u for all s 2 ^ f￿1 (^ u) and f0 (s) = x^ u for all s 2 ^ f0￿1 (^ u). By construction, f and f0
induce the same distribution over X with respect to P: Thus by probabilistic sophistication,









Following the proof of Lemma 4 of Safra & Segal (1998, pp 35-37),13 there exists a set




















(2) ) (1) For any pair of acts f;g 2 F, if P (f￿1 (x)) = P (g￿1 (x)) for all x 2 X, then
F P
u￿f (z) = F P
u￿g (z) for all z 2 R. Thus we have



















and hence f ￿ g, as required.
A few remarks are due. First, as we asserted in Introduction, Marrinacci￿ s Result applied
to the MEU model is a corollary to this result. To see this, notice that given expression (4)
and Proposition 1, we see that condition (2) above implies that every Q 2 C is a member
of the core of capacity ￿￿ (￿) := 1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ P (￿)), and thus ￿￿ (E) = minQ2C Q(E) for any
E 2 ￿.14 Choose any ￿ 2 ￿. Now assume in addition that there exists an event E 2 ￿, such
that 0 < minQ2C Q(E) = maxQ2C Q(E) < 1. Since each Q 2 C is a probability measure
so that Q(E) + Q(SnE) = 1, this additional condition implies that ￿￿ (E) + ￿￿ (SnE) = 1.
Thus by the de￿nition of ￿￿, ￿(1 ￿ P (E)) + ￿(P (E)) = 1. This is possible only if ￿ is
linear, since ￿ is concave and ￿(0) = 0 and ￿(1) = 1 In conclusion, any ￿ 2 ￿ must be the
linear function ￿(z) = z, and hence (7) induces SEU (1).
Secondly, note that the formula (7) is not necessarily SRDEU; (7) is a minimum of several
13 Dana (2005, Corollary 3.3) proves a similar result. The proof of Lemma 4 of Safra & Segal ￿rst
establishes that V ￿ in our model is well de￿ned and satis￿es distribution invariance, then show that V ￿
has representation (7). Strictly speaking, the proof needs to be modi￿ed since they consider the set of all
non-negative random variables whereas the random variables in our model are ￿nite ranged and have a
restricted range U. But a careful reading will show that this can be readily acheived as long as U has a
non-empty interior. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix.
14 See Schmeidler (1972).
17Choquet integrals, which is not necessarily comonotonic additive and hence not representable
by a Choquet integral.15 Thus we conclude that the class of probabilistically sophisticated
MEU is even strictly larger than that of SRDEU.16
Finally, in view of Lemma 3, any probabilistically sophisticated MEU preferences can
be built up from the "-contaminated ￿ truncated-prior functionals. This suggests that this
simple class of preferences is fundamental to study the implications of probabilistically so-
phisticated MEU, and hence the widely used "-contamination model focuses on only the half
of the whole picture.
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19Appendix
A Proof of Theorem: (1) ) (2)
The proof draws on Segal and Safra￿ s (1998) analysis of preferences over lotteries that exhibit
constant risk aversion. In particular it adapts the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 4
pp35-37.
Let P be the probability with respect to which % is probabilistically sophisticated. Let




u￿f (z), which is the set of minimizing probabilities.
Lemma 5 Every Q 2 C is absolutely continuous with respect to P.
Proof. Suppose not. That is, suppose E 2 ￿, P (E) = 0 and maxQ2C Q(E) = q > 0.
Let [^ yE^ x] denote the act for which [^ yE^ x](s) = ^ y if s 2 E and [^ yE^ x](s) = ^ x if s = 2 S.

















u￿^ x (z) = min
Q2C
Z





u￿[^ yE^ x] (z)
I.e. ^ x ￿ [^ yE^ x], a contradiction.
First note that Lemma 5 implies that, for all f 2 F, Q 2 C, and z;z0 2 R,
F
P









Fix an act f 2 F and probability measure Q 2 C, and de￿ne a function ￿
Q






> > > > > > <














0, p = 0
‘(p), otherwise,




f continuous on [0;1]. That is, if we write u ￿ f (S) = fz1;:::;zng where
20z1 < z2 < ￿￿￿ < zn, and Ei = (u ￿ f)
￿1 (zi) for each i = 1;:::;n; the graph of ￿
Q
f is obtained








So, in addition to being continuous, by construction ￿
Q
f is non-decreasing and onto and
F
Q
u￿f (z) = ￿
Q
f ￿F P










f ￿ F P
u￿f (z)
i
holds. Fix f 2 F and Qf 2 Cmin (f) arbitrarily. Since the property above holds for any
Q 2 C, we have in particular that:






















Note that these equalities do not depend on the choice of Qf, and so we shall write Qf for
an arbitrarily chosen element of Cmin (f) from now on.
De￿ne W : F ! R by












We shall show that W (f) = V (f) for any f 2 F. By de￿nition W (f) ￿ V (f) for any
f 2 F. So suppose the strict inequality holds; that is, there exists f such that W (f) = ￿ v <















We ￿rst show that if the range of u(￿) has a non-empty interior, then probabilistic
sophistication implies that C exhibits the following symmetry property with respect to P.
De￿nition 6 (Symmetry) A convex compact set C ￿ PPis symmetric with respect to P,
if the following condition holds: for any n > 1, and any pair of n-event partitions of S,




= 1=n for every i = 1;:::;n, for









, i = 1;:::;n.
21Lemma 6 Suppose that the richness condition is satis￿ed. If the relation % generated by




u￿f (z) is probabilistically sophisticated with respect to P 2 P, then C
is symmetric with respect to P.
Proof. Suppose that the symmetry condition is a violated: that is, there is a pair of





for every i = 1;:::;n, and there is a ￿ Q 2 C and a permutation ￿ ￿ : f1;:::;ng ! f1;:::;ng,









, i = 1;:::;n.
We shall construct two acts ￿ f and ^ f such that F P
u￿ ￿ f = F P


















: Q 2 C
o
.
By the convexity and compactness of C, ￿C and ^ ￿C are convex and compact subsets of
￿n￿1 := f(q1;:::;qn) : qi ￿ 0,
Pn
i=1 qi = 1g: Notice that for an act f which is measur-
able with respect to fE1;:::;Eng, we have V (f) = minq2￿C
Pn
i=1 qi (u ￿ f (Ei)). Simi-














For each vector z 2 Rn, write z￿ ￿ for the element which is obtained from z by permutation
￿ ￿, i.e., z￿ ￿
i = z￿ ￿(i) for i = 1;:::;n. Let ￿ q = (￿ q1;:::; ￿ qn) :=
￿ ￿ Q(E1);:::; ￿ Q(En)
￿
2 ￿C. Then
our hypothesis above implies that ￿ q￿ ￿ 62 ^ ￿C.
Since ￿C and ^ ￿C are compact and convex subsets of the hyperplane fz 2 Rn :
Pn
i=1 zi =
1g, applying the separation theorem we can ￿nd ￿ z 2 Rn such that ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ z￿ ￿ < min^ q2^ ￿C ^ q ￿ ￿ z￿ ￿.
On the other hand, ￿ q￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ z￿ ￿ = ￿ q ￿ ￿ z by construction, and since ￿ q 2 ￿C, we conclude that
minq2￿C q ￿ ￿ z < min^ q2^ ￿C ^ q ￿ ￿ z￿ ￿.
Since the interior of fu(x) : x 2 Xg is non-empty by assumption, pick ￿ in the interior
of this set, and choose ￿ > 0 small enough so that ￿ + ￿￿ zi 2 fu(x) : x 2 Xg for i = 1;::;n:
Pick for each i = 1;:::;n, ￿ xi 2 X such that u(￿ xi) = ￿ + ￿￿ zi. Then de￿ne acts ￿ f and ^ f
which are measurable with respect to fE1;:::;Eng and f ^ E1;:::; ^ Eng, respectively, by the




= ￿ x￿ ￿
i for i = 1;:::;n By construction, u ￿ ￿ f (Ei) = ￿ + ￿￿ zi and




= ￿ + ￿￿ z￿ ￿
i for i = 1;:::;n, and F P


















i=1 qi (￿ + ￿￿ zi) < min^ q2^ ￿C
Pn
i=1 ^ qi (￿ + ￿￿ z￿ ￿











F n be the set of all acts g 2 F such that u￿g has at most n di⁄erent ￿ utility levels￿





= 1=n. An immediate implication of Lemma 6 is
that if f and ^ f are both in
￿ !





Now consider the situation where there exists n and ^ f such that f, ^ f 2
￿ !
F n, and F P
u￿ ^ f =
F P
u￿ ￿ f. By symmetry of C, ￿
￿ Q
￿ f = ￿
^ Q
^ f which implies W (f) = V (f), a contradiction.
If there is no such n then, by continuity, there exists n large enough for which there exist
fn, ^ fn 2
￿ !












< ￿ v + 1=2(v ￿ ￿ v)
and V (fn) > ￿ v + 1=2(v ￿ ￿ v), a contradiction.




u￿h : h 2 F
o










It remains for us to show that each ￿
Qf
f is concave.
Lemma 7 The function ￿
Qf
f is concave for every f 2 F.
Proof. Suppose for some f 2 F, ￿
Qf
f is not concave. Write u ￿ f (S) = fz1;:::;zng where
z1 < z2 < ￿￿￿ < zn, and Ei = (u ￿ f)
￿1 (zi) for each i = 1;:::;n: Then
Pi











f does not depend on P-null events, we can





















each i = 1;:::;n.
From the structure of the graph of ￿
Q(f)
u￿f , it is clear that ￿
Q(f)
u￿f is non-concave if and only







23Lemma 8 Let Q be absolutely continuous with respect to the P 2 P, and let events A and

























Proof. By the convex rangedness assumption, we can ￿nd events A0 ￿ A and B0 ￿
B such that both P (A0) and P (B0) are rational numbers, and 0 < Q(A0)=P (A0) <
Q(B0)=P (B0) < 1. So it su¢ ces to establish the statement for the case P (A) and P (B)
are rationals. Find an ￿ > 0 such that P (A) = m￿ and P (B) = n￿ for some integers m
and n. By convex valudedness assumption, we can ￿nd a partitions fAi : i = 1;:::;mg of A
and fBj : j = 1;:::;ng of B such that P (Ai) = P (Bj) = ￿ for any i and j.
Since Q(A) =
Pn
i=1 Q(Ai), there must be at least one i￿ such that Q(Ai￿)=P (Ai￿) =
Q(Ai￿)=￿ ￿ Q(A)=P (A). Similarly, there must be at least one j￿ with Q(Bj￿)=￿ ￿



































. So consider the act g de￿ned to be
u ￿ g (s) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
zi if s 2 ^ B
zi+1 if s 2 ^ A
u ￿ f (s) otherwise
By construction, we have by direct calculation:















u￿f (z) = V (f).








and so by construction u￿g induces the same
distribution of utility indices over fz1;:::;zng. So by probabilistic sophistication it follows
V (f) = V (g), a contradiction. ￿
























De￿ne >CON to be the partial ordering of ￿ more concave￿de￿ned over TCON. That is,
for any pair ￿;￿
0 2 TCON, ￿ >CON ￿
0 if ￿ =   ￿ ￿
0 for some   2 TCON and ￿ 6= ￿
0. Notice




































, for some g 2 F.
We thus construct our set of probability transformation functions by selecting the set of



















V (f) = min
￿2￿
￿Z
zd
￿
￿ ￿ F
P
u￿f (z)
￿￿
,
as required. ￿
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